American Airlines Flight 587 ENGINES CAME OFF

get out of it, get out of it

THRUST REVERSER   ENGINES SEPARATED  

Federal investigators still have no evidence indicating that a benign structural failure played a role in the tail breaking off of Flight 587 last month, sending the plane tumbling into Queens, N.Y., according to AviationNow.com. 

But as National Transportation Safety Board and other safety experts wrestle to solve the mystery of the powerful forces that ripped the plane's fin off and then cast the engines from their mountings, one aviation expert said sabotage of the aircraft's left engine while still on the ground could explain what shook the aircraft to pieces. 

Expert Marshall Smith opined, "A single point failure, the in-flight actuation of the left engine thrust reverser, can account for all three observed phenomena of the clean breaking off of the tail and the failure of both pylons holding the engines. 

"If the left engine thrust reverser had either partially or completely actuated during flight, it would cause the plane to go into a flat spin to the left. The airplane would spin something like a flat Frisbee with the right engine pushing forward and the left engine pushing backwards," Marshall explained. 

"Within a second of the flat spin occurring, the sideways windblast would rip off the tail assembly, since it was never designed to take such a side blast of air. 

"As soon as the tail assembly broke off, there is now very little wind resistance to the flat spin. At this point the engines would cause the aircraft to spin even faster with the g-forces away from the center of the spin becoming so great that both engines would be violently ripped off the wings and thrown outward away from the plane," Marshall said. 

Marshall's opinion is that the spin accounted for why the engines were found so far away from the crash site and why the tail came off first. 

Terrorist Scenario 

The mechanical engineer, aviation ground school instructor and former NASA adviser painted this scenario: 

During the night, a terrorist saboteur disguised as a ground crew mechanic reached up in the back of the left jet engine of the American Airlines Airbus and cut the hydraulic line going to the thrust reverser actuator and the control safety sensor lines. 

The next morning after the jet engines were started, the hydraulic fluid began dripping from the cut line. 

When the aircraft was about 3,000 feet in the air, the sound of an "airframe rattle" was heard in the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) record. Cause: the tampered-with left thrust reverser had started to close, causing the plane to turn to the left. 

The pilot compensated by applying right rudder to bring the nose back to straight flight by turning to the right. 

The aircraft commenced a "side slip." During this condition, the burbling air flowing over the extended control surfaces made the plane shake, rattle and roll, accounting for the airframe rattle noise heard on the CVR at 107 seconds into the flight. 

The pilot thought he had overcompensated, worried about losing too much airspeed, and returned the controls to normal. The rattling momentarily stopped as indicated on the CVR. 

The plane continued to turn back to the left.

Seven seconds later, one of the flight crew commented about "air turbulence." 

 The pilot again tried to compensate for the plane's strong drift to the left caused by the partially closing thrust reverser by again applying right rudder and opposite aileron. The same rattling sound is heard at 121 seconds into the flight. 

Four seconds later, at 125 seconds into the flight, the first officer calls for "full power," presumably to compensate for the side slip, which had slowed the plane down to dangerously low speed. 

As soon as the power went to full, the spinning effect caused by the partially or fully actuated thrust reverser caused the plane to spin out of control in a flat spin. 

Two seconds later, at 127 seconds, the CVR indicated the flight crew making a comment about being out of control. No more comments are made after that, and the recording ends 17 seconds later when the plane hits the ground. 

Fighting to control the aircraft, the pilot held full right rudder and hard left aileron just as the left thrust reverser came into the full-on position. The application of full power greatly increased the turn to the left, created a huge side force on the tail and rudder assembly, and snapped them off cleanly. 

Within another second, without the vertical tail assembly to slow the spin, the plane spun violently to the left about the center of gravity of the airplane. The plane spun horizontally with the full power from both engines increasing the spin faster and faster until both engines broke off.

The flight crew at the front was thrown violently forward with such g-force they were instantly rendered unconscious or killed, explaining why no more comments from the flight crew are heard after applying full power. 

With the plane completely out of control and the engines still running at full power, the engines broke away ripping the fuel tanks in both wings and igniting the plane. 

Wake Turbulence Discounted 

Marshall created his saboteur scenario because he concluded early on that it is not possible for any type of wake turbulence from a preceding jet to rip off the tail of an airplane. Furthermore, he concluded, even with the vertical stabilizer gone, Flight 587 would not have gone out of control in such a way that both engines would also fall off. 

He pointed to a 1985 incident where a Japanese Boeing 747 with the vertical tail assembly completely torn away continued to fly in large circles for over half an hour before hitting a mountain. 

According to Marshall, Flight 587, an Airbus A300, used a modern "fly-by-wire" computer system and could fly quite easily with complete loss of the vertical fin and rudder. 

"Most air accident investigators would easily conclude that the chances of three simultaneous airframe failures all occurring at the same time is not probable. It must be one or the other but not all three. It would be much easier to conclude that something else actually caused all three failures," Marshall said. 

Marshall pointed to a statement by New York City Mayor Rudolph Guiliani at a news conference Nov. 14 that the rescue workers recovered 262 bodies including "a man still holding a baby." 

"Certainly no man can be strong enough to hold on to a baby through that force, unless instead the plane was in a flat spin. For the passengers in the center of the plane, the force would have been downward [not forward] as the plane hit the ground, and the baby would be simply forced deeper into the man's lap as he sat in the passenger seat. 

Further clues pointing to his theory, said Marshall: news videos of the crash scene as firemen put out the flames. A large section of the central part of the plane is lying on the ground almost intact but in flames.

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?ev_id=20011130X02321&key=1

NTSB Identification: DCA02MA001. Scheduled 14 CFR AMERICAN AIRLINES INC

Accident occurred Monday, November 12, 2001 in Belle Harbor, NY
Probable Cause Approval Date: 4/14/2005
Aircraft: Airbus Industrie A300B4-605R, registration: N14053
Injuries: 265 Fatal.

The Board's full report is available at http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/publictn.htm.


On November 12, 2001, about 0916:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport, Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane's vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane's engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 587 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. 

The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident as follows:

the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer's unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.

On November 12, 2001, about 0916:15 eastern standard time, American Airlines flight 587, an Airbus Industrie A300-605R, N14053, crashed into a residential area of Belle Harbor, New York, shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York. Flight 587 was a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Las Americas International Airport, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, with 2 flight crewmembers, 7 flight attendants, and 251 passengers aboard the airplane. The airplane's vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in flight and were found in Jamaica Bay, about 1 mile north of the main wreckage site. The airplane's engines subsequently separated in flight and were found several blocks north and east of the main wreckage site. All 260 people aboard the airplane and 5 people on the ground were killed, and the airplane was destroyed by impact forces and a postcrash fire. Flight 587 was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 on an instrument flight rules flight plan. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident. 

The accident airplane arrived at JFK about 2231 on the night before the accident. The airplane had been flown from San Jose, Costa Rica, to JFK with an intermediate stop in Miami International Airport, Miami, Florida. During postaccident interviews, the pilots of the flight leg from MIA to JFK indicated that the flight was smooth and uneventful. 

Flight 587 was the first leg of a 1-day roundtrip sequence for the flight crew. American Airlines records indicated that the captain checked in for the flight about 0614 and that the first officer checked in about 0630. The gate agent working the flight arrived at the departure gate about 0645. She stated that the flight attendants were already aboard the airplane at that time and that the captain and the first officer arrived at the gate about 0700. 

About 0710, the airplane fueling process began. The airplane fueler indicated that, during the fueling process, he saw one of the pilots perform an exterior inspection of the airplane. He finished the fueling process about 0745 and stated that he saw nothing unusual regarding the airplane.

Statements provided to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Department by American Airlines maintenance and avionics personnel indicated that, sometime between 0730 and 0800, the captain reported that the number 2 pitch trim and yaw damper system would not engage. Two avionics technicians were sent to the airplane to investigate the problem. They performed an auto flight system (AFS) check, which indicated a fault with the number 2 flight augmentation computer. The circuit breaker was then reset, another AFS check was performed, and no fault was detected. In addition, an autoland system check was performed, and that test also did not detect a fault. The avionics technicians estimated that they were in the cockpit for 5 to 7 minutes. 

The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recording began about 0845:35. The CVR indicated that, about 0859:58, the airplane was cleared to push back from the gate. About 0901:33, the ground controller provided the flight crew with taxi instructions to runway 31L, and the first officer acknowledged these instructions. About 0902:05, the captain told the first officer, "your leg, you check the rudders." (The first officer was the flying pilot, and the captain was the nonflying pilot.) Data from the flight data recorder (FDR) showed that, about 0902:07, the rudder pedal check began. The FDR data also showed that a maximum right rudder pedal deflection of about 3.7 inches was recorded about 0902:11 and that a maximum left rudder pedal deflection of 3.6 inches was recorded about 0902:19. About 0902:23, the first officer responded, "rudders check." The FDR data showed that the rudder pedals returned to their neutral position about 0902:25.

About 0906:53, the ground controller provided the pilots of Japan Air Lines flight 47, a Boeing 747-400, with taxi instructions to runway 31L. About 0908:01, the ground controller instructed the Japan Air Lines pilots to contact the local (tower) controller. About 0908:58, the ground controller instructed the flight 587 pilots to follow the Japan Air Lines airplane and to contact the local controller. The first officer acknowledged this instruction.

About 0911:08, the local controller cleared the Japan Air Lines airplane for takeoff. About 0911:36, the local controller cautioned the flight 587 pilots about wake turbulence and instructed the pilots to taxi into position and hold for runway 31L. The first officer acknowledged the instruction. About 0913:05, the local controller instructed the Japan Air Lines pilots to fly the bridge climb and to contact the departure controller at the New York Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON). About 0913:21, the flight 587 captain said to the first officer, "you have the airplane."

About 0913:28, the local controller cleared flight 587 for takeoff, and the captain acknowledged the clearance. About 0913:35, the first officer asked the captain, "you happy with that [separation] distance?" About 3 seconds later, the captain replied, "we'll be all right once we get rollin'. He's supposed to be five miles by the time we're airborne, that's the idea." About 0913:46, the first officer said, "so you're happy."

The National Transportation Safety Board's airplane performance study for this accident0 determined that flight 587 started its takeoff roll about 0913:51 and lifted off about 0914:29, which was about 1 minute 40 seconds after the Japan Air Lines airplane. About 0914:43, the local controller instructed the flight 587 pilots to turn left, fly the bridge climb, and contact the New York TRACON departure controller. About 5 seconds later, the captain acknowledged this instruction. Radar data indicated that the airplane climbed to 500 feet above mean sea level (msl) and then entered a climbing left turn to a heading of 220º. About 0915:00, the captain made initial contact with the departure controller, informing him that the airplane was at 1,300 feet msl and climbing to 5,000 feet msl. About 0915:05, the departure controller instructed flight 587 to climb to and maintain 13,000 feet msl, and the captain acknowledged this instruction about 5 seconds later. About 0915:29, the CVR recorded the captain's statement "clean machine," indicating that the gear, flaps, and slats had all been retracted.

About 0915:35, flight 587 was climbing through 1,700 feet msl with its wings approximately level. About 1 second later, the departure controller instructed flight 587 to turn left and proceed direct to the WAVEY navigation intersection (located about 30 miles southeast of JFK). About 0915:41, the captain acknowledged the instruction. The controller did not receive any further transmissions from flight 587. 

FDR data indicated that, about 0915:36, the airplane experienced a 0.04 G drop in longitudinal load factor, a 0.07 G shift to the left in lateral load factor, and about a 0.3 G drop in normal (vertical) load factor. The airplane performance study found that these excursions were consistent with a wake turbulence encounter. Between 0915:36 and 0915:41, the FDR recorded movement of the control column, control wheel, and rudder pedals. Specifically, the control column moved from approximately 0º (neutral) to 2º nose up, 2º nose down, and back to 0º; the control wheel moved a total of seven times, with peaks at 18º right, 30º left, 37º right, 34º left, 5º left, 21º left, and 23º right, before moving to between 5º and 6º left; and the rudder pedals moved from about 0.1 inch left (the starting point for the pedals) to about 0.1 inch right and 0.2 inch left before moving to 0.1 inch left. The airplane performance study indicated that, during this time, the rudder moved from 0º (neutral) to about 2º left, about 0.6º right, and back to 0º. 

During the wake turbulence encounter, the airplane's pitch angle increased from 9º to 11.5º, decreased to about 10º, and increased again to 11º. The airplane's bank angle moved from 0º (wings level) to 17º left wing down, which was consistent with the turn to
the WAVEY navigation intersection. 

At 0915:44.7, the captain stated, "little wake turbulence, huh?" to which the first officer replied, at 0915:45.6, "yeah." At 0915:48.2, the first officer indicated that he wanted the airspeed set to 250 knots, which was the maximum speed for flight below 10,000 feet msl. At that point, the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,300 feet msl.

FDR data indicated that, about 0915:51, the load factors began excursions that were similar to those that occurred about 0915:36: the longitudinal load factor dropped from 0.20 to 0.14 G, the lateral load factor shifted 0.05 G to the left, and the normal load factor dropped from 1.0 to 0.6 G. The airplane performance study found that these excursions were also consistent with a wake turbulence encounter. According to the FDR, the airplane's bank angle moved from 23º to 25º left wing down at 0915:51.5, the control wheel moved to 64º right at 0915:51.5, and the rudder pedals moved to 1.7 inches right at 0915:51.9.

At 0915:51.8, 0915:52.3, and 0915:52.9, the CVR recorded the sound of a thump, a click, and two thumps, respectively. At 0915:54.2, the first officer stated, in a strained voice, "max power." At that point, the airplane was traveling at 240 knots. About 0915:55, the captain asked, "you all right?" to which the first officer replied, "yeah, I'm fine." One second later, the captain stated, "hang onto it. Hang onto it." The CVR recorded the sound of a snap at 0915:56.6, the first officer's statement "let's go for power please" at 0915:57.5, and the sound of a loud thump at 0915:57.7. According to the airplane performance study, the vertical stabilizer's right rear main attachment fitting fractured at 0915:58.4, and the vertical stabilizer separated from the airplane immediately afterward. At 0915:58.5, the CVR recorded the sound of a loud bang. At that time, the airplane was traveling at an airspeed of about 251 knots.

According to the FDR, the rudder pedals moved from 1.7 inches right to 1.7 inches left, 1.7 inches right, 2.0 inches right, 2.4 inches left, and 1.3 inches right between 0915:52 and 0915:58.5. Also, the FDR showed that the control wheel moved 64º to the right at 0915:51.5, 78º (full) to the left at 0915:53.5, 64º to the right at 0915:55.5, and 78º to the left at 0915:56.5. 

The airplane performance study estimated that, at 0915:53.2, the rudder was deflected 11º to the left, and the sideslip angle at the airplane's center of gravity (cg) was about 4º to the left (after peaking temporarily at 5º to the left).21 At 0915:56.8, the rudder was deflected 10.2º to the left, and the sideslip angle was about 7º to the left. At 0915:58.4 (the time that the right rear main attachment fitting fractured), the rudder was deflected between 10º and 11º to the right, the sideslip angle was between 11º and 12º to the right, and the airplane experienced a 0.2 G shift to the right in lateral load factor.

The CVR recorded, at 0916:00.0, a sound similar to a grunt and, 1 second later, the first officer's statement, "holy [expletive]." At 0916:04.4, the CVR recorded a sound similar to a stall warning repetitive chime, which lasted for 1.9 seconds. At 0916:07.5, the first officer stated, "what the hell are we into…we're stuck in it." At 0916:12.8, the captain stated, "get out of it, get out of it." The CVR recording ended 2 seconds later. The airplane was located at 40º 34' 37.59" north latitude and 73º 51' 01.31" west longitude. The accident occurred during the hours of daylight.

get out of it, get out of it

THRUST REVERSER   ENGINES SEPARATED