CIA directed STATE MURDERS in Turkey - truth now coming out
"The fact that an opinion has been widely held is no evidence whatever that it is not utterly absurd; indeed, in view of the silliness of the majority of mankind, a widespread belief is more likely to be foolish than sensible."
Bertrand Russell, Marriage and Morals, p. 58
It was particularly interesting that the Maraş incidents of Dec. 19-26, 1978 started shortly after the screening of a film on Crimean Turks escaping Stalin’s persecution. Ülkü Ocakları, a youth organization of the far right political front, sponsored the screening of the film “When Will the Sun Rise?” The events started when the movie theater was bombed.
On Dec. 20, Akın Kıraathanesi, attended mostly by Alevis, was bombed because of rumors alleging that leftists were responsible for the previous bombing. Violence steadily escalated and led to a massive attack on Dec. 23. During the turmoil, 111 were killed, 1,000 were injured and 552 homes were destroyed in Maraş. No information or evidence was found on who marked the workplaces and homes of Alevi residents during the events. Despite security forces surrounding the city, no action was taken to prevent the escalation of violence.
These events, which served and were used as justification for the military coup in 1980, were illuminated many years later. Despite portrayal of the events as sectarian and ideological clashes, a document from 1979 in Ecevit’s archives that was revealed in 2006 shows that National Intelligence Organization (MİT) agents instigated the clashes.
The strictly confidential document, bearing a note indicating that it was provided by a reliable source, says:
“Because no prior notice indicating that serious events would take place was given by responsible authorities after the [Republican People’s Party] CHP took office, hundreds of persons died. They even played influential roles in the outbreak of these events. The Maraş events were sponsored by MİT. Were MİT not involved in the events, it would have received intelligence months ago and taken the necessary measures to prevent their outbreak.”
The Maraş incident was the final chapter of a series of events in which a number of unresolved murders were committed. Martial law was declared in 13 provinces including Maraş on Dec. 26. The time for the military coup was slowly approaching.
Then-Interior Minister Hasan Fehmi Güneş said: “The Maraş events were part of a big plot. They were all planned. Our ministry did extensive work to resolve this. Everything has been done. But all has failed.”
Ökkeş Şendiller, the primary suspect in the provocation of the Maraş events, who also served as a Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and Grand Unity Party (BBP) deputy in Parliament, noted in a book he wrote years later that his view on the events had changed. Şendiller stressed that the document in Ecevit’s archives needs to be taken into account.
“The administration is responsible for the state of ignorance. It also acted decisively to hide the facts. This incident was a milestone used as justification for the Sept. 12 coup. The plot has become so influential and destructive that the event’s plotters did not imagine the magnitude and gravity of subsequent developments. The document found in Ecevit’s archives refers to MİT. The undersecretary of the organization was a military officer back then. MİT, the General Staff, the National Police Department and the government are all under suspicion in this case.”
Şendiller argued that external and internal actors played extensive roles in the outbreak of the events, adding that the seven uncircumcised bodies found on the spot pointed to the involvement of external actors in the incident.
“The Revolutionary War Organization, responsible for the bombing of the Çiçek movie theater, provoking the people and murdering two teachers, was found guilty by the Adana Court of Martial Law. It became evident that the Revolutionary People’s Union Organization, founded by Garbis Altınyan, planned the whole incident. The People’s Liberation Organization and pro-Apo members were also found guilty of murders and other violent actions. However, judgments by martial law courts were all ignored after 1980.”
Similar plots were staged in Çorum, Sivas and Amasya in an attempt to incite a military coup.
The background of the events in Çorum in which 57 people were killed was more interesting. The events were started after the governor, the police chief and the education director of the city, where Alevis and Sunnis were living together, were removed from office at the same time. It was also interesting that the events broke out shortly after Robert Alexander Peck from the US Embassy in Turkey paid a visit to the city. Peck also visited Amasya and Tokat, other ethnically vulnerable and susceptible cities.
The events broke out after rumors were spread alleging that the outfits of female students at rehearsals for May 19 Youth and Sports Day celebrations were contrary to Islamic and national traditions and customs.
Gün Sazak from the MHP, who was serving as customs minister was murdered; this unsolved murder further escalated the tension. A total of 57 people were killed in predominantly Alevi neighborhoods in events that started after an insurgency by nationalist youth organizations after Sazak’s murder.
‘Our boys did it’
When the military overthrew the Turkish government on Sept. 12, 1980, Paul Henze, the US National Security Council adviser at the time, passed a note to President Jimmy Carter that read, “Our boys did it.”
This evidence, though initially denied by Henze himself, was later documented by Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, leaving no room for doubt that clandestine forces within and outside the state were controlling the country.
It is now known that the ideological clash between leftist and rightist groups was masterfully exploited by some circles before the coup. Random raids on coffee shops or cafes were then the most frequent methods of violence. A similar method was followed in Istanbul’s Gaziosmanpaşa district on March 12, 1995, when three coffee houses were attacked; the houses were mostly patronized by Alevis. The events that led Turkey to the Sept. 12 environment include the following:
A bomb was detonated in front of İstanbul University on March 16, 1978; seven college students were killed. On April 17, 1978, Malatya Mayor Hamid Fendoğlu was killed by a package bomb that was sent to his home.
In August 1978, a coffee house was attacked in Ankara, killing five. Seven college students who were members of the Labor Party (EMEP) were murdered in Ankara on Oct. 8, 1978. On Oct. 20 of the same year, Professor Bedir Karafakioğlu was assassinated.
On Dec. 18, 1978, Turkish Union of Engineers and Architects’ Chambers (TMMOB) Chairman Akın Özdemir was assassinated in Adana. Abdi İpekçi, editor-in-chief of the Milliyet daily, was murdered on Feb. 1, 1979. Seven died in a coffee house raid in Ankara on May 16, 1979.
Adana Police Chief Cevat Yurdakul was assassinated on Sept. 28, and six were killed in a coffee house attack on Oct. 27 in İstanbul. Professor Ümit Doğanay was killed on Nov. 20. Five died in a coffee house raid in Kayseri on Nov. 28.
On Dec. 7, 1979, Professor Cavit Orhan Tütengil was killed. A special team of four members who killed the professor -- who was also the chairman of the Institute of Sociology at the faculty of economics at İstanbul University and a columnist for Cumhuriyet daily -- left a note on his body that read, “Neither America, nor Russia: The only way is independent Turkey” and signed it “Anti-terror association.” Investigations and trials have been inconclusive, and the murder dossier eventually disappeared.
A coffee house in İstanbul was bombed on Dec. 16, 1979, killing five people. Customs Minister Gün Sazak was killed on May 27, 1980; the murder remains unsolved. On July 22, 1980, Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Unions (DİSK) and Maden İş Union Chairman Kemal Türkler was murdered.
Special Warfare Unit goes out of control
Gen. Kenan Evren, who led the Sept. 12 military coup and also served as the chairman of the National Security Council (MGK) in the aftermath of the coup, played a determinative role in the Special Warfare Unit’s increasing loss of control. The special security unit that Evren assigned to eliminate the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) terrorist organization, which was responsible for the murders of 41 Turkish diplomats, looked for other options for survival after accomplishing its mission.
Abdullah Çatlı, who died in a car accident in Susurluk, was the most prominent figure in this organization. Gen. Veli Küçük maintained contact with Çatlı during his service in Nevşehir. The Special Warfare Unit, confident that it had eliminated ASALA, decided to deal with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) after 1985. But the unit got out of control and became corrupt because of the involvement of some of its members in illegal activities in the Southeast, including drug trafficking and arms smuggling. Even the state officially admitted after the Susurluk accident that the unit was corrupt.
Even the European Court of Human Rights rulings confirmed the unit’s involvement in illegal activities and some unsolved murders during their combat against terror. Then-police chief Mehmet Ağar was one of the leading names. Ağar was elected as a deputy in 1995 and served as a deputy until 2007, never standing trial. Even after his immunity was lifted, no court has dealt with his dossier.
It is known that the Special Warfare Unit got out of control during the Süleyman Demirel and Tansu Çiller-led governments between 1992 and 1995. During this period, the government endorsed an outlawed method against terrorism. This was confirmed by a notorious statement by Çiller, who said, “Those who fire a bullet and those who take a bullet for the nation are honorable.”
Additional documents and information now show that Ergenekon played a role even in these relatively older incidents. In 2005, military officers from the Special Forces Command were arrested because of their affiliation with illegal gangs in Ankara. The former head of intelligence at the National Police Department, Bülent Orakoğlu, commented on these arrests:
“The civilian elements within the special forces are not under control and discipline. The Council of State attack, Atabeyler and Sauna -- these all point to the same address. An illegal entity within the state that does not rely on a legal framework but exercises the state’s authorities generates all this. Retired military officers are involved in all of this.”
Çarkın: I murdered 1,000 people
Confessions made by former special operations police officer Ayhan Çarkın, who served on the team of İbrahim Şahin, who has been detained as part of the Ergenekon investigation and was convicted in the Susurluk case, were terrifying. In an interview aired by the Star TV station, Çarkın said, “I may have killed 1,000 people during my combat against terrorism.”
Nurhan Yorulmaz, the mother of special operations police officer Oğuz Yorulmaz, had previously admitted that her son was used by the state. “The state made my son and his friends commit these unsolved murders. The Ergenekon involves not only the pashas but also politicians. I gave my son to the state as a civil servant, not as a gang member. They killed around 93 to 94 people.”
How the CHP became an advocate of Ergenekon
A substantial part of Ülkücüs (activist nationalists) admitted after the Sept. 12 military coup that they were used by the state. But their ideological opponent never did the same. The leftists groups argued that the state organized these nationalists to take action against them; they also believe that the Special Warfare Unit and the counter-guerilla entities played an extensive role in the making of the coup. The leftist parties, which assert that the Gladio was made part of the system in Turkey during the reign of the Democrat Party (DP) in the 1950s, asked that aggressive action be taken against Gladio, which was funded by NATO until 2005.
Former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit went after this entity for years, but he failed. The Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP), which was revitalized by Deniz Baykal and his associates in 1992 after its dissolution during the military administration of the Sept. 12 coup, relied on a discourse focusing on the elimination of the counter-guerilla organization. But when Baykal declared himself an advocate of Ergenekon, he contradicted the CHP’s historical mission.