Wednesday, January 14, 2009

ISRAEL - TURKEY -- Deep State Secret

The current unearthing of FALSE FLAG terror points at a possibly
DEADLY DESTRUCTIVE secret that Israeli Military Intelligence
who have to cover up 9/11 for ever.

The Egenerkon probe and the CLEAN THE HOUSE actino by the laudable
Turkish Prime Minister is firstly designed to make Turkey into a DECENT
country that respects human rights and doesn't slaughter innocents for
political gain (i.e. the definition of terror).

Germany, Italy and the rest of europe have done this in the 1990s,
it was done quietly, without the internet scrutiny.
In germany just say CELLER LOCH.. a false flag operation in 1978.
(see at bottom of this article for details)

to "Agaf HaModiin" or Military Intelligence Directorate (Israel)
(see at bottom of this article for details) server was DOWN.. I rescued this from Google.

Ergenekon: The Turkish Gladio?

The Unresolved Assassinations from Susurluk to Ergenekon

Several assassinations that took place in Turkey have always raised suspicions and skepticism even when their murderers were found. This .period of skepticism. begins as early as the 1970s continues through the 1990s and 2000s. The commonly known assassins Mehmet Ali Ag(ca, Mahmut Y?ld?r?m (also known as "Yes,il" - meaning: green) and Alparslan Aslan have a common symbolic meaning for this period. These symbols can be summarized as terrorizing the citizens in the country creating chaos and shift Turkey from a democracy to an authoritarian rule by using fear tactics. Everyone in Turkey wonders whether these assassinations had more meaning leading everyone to think more about the .deep state. (derin devlet), gangs, and counter terrorism organizations. What are even more mysterious are the unresolved assassinations. Most of these people were executed with remote controlled bombs, special assassination guns or plastic bombs.

Turkey After Susurluk
In 1996, Turkey came very close to understanding the mysteries behind all the resolved and unresolved assassinations. This year, a hope emerged to shed a light on these assassinations when a Mercedes hit a truck which led to the discovery of several guns and documents in the town of Susurluk in Bal?kesir. The passengers in the car were an assassin named Abdullah Çatl?, Parliament member Sedat Bucak, and chief of police Hüseyin Kocadag(. There were two important things to remember in this incident. One of them was the .one minute of darkness for light forever. campaign and the other is how the Prime Minister of Turkey identified the expectations of the people as .gulu gulu dance.(a term used to humiliate the supporters). Thus, despite people.s demand to investigate the issue thoroughly, the incident and all the clues reached from the accident were covered up by assigning a weak and inefficient parliamentary commission. Regardless of the complaints from commission members, higher level bureaucrats found the strength to hide their agenda from the government under the name of .state secret. . A secret even the government never found out. The short term hope to resolve the mysteries suddenly turned into disappointment among the people. The conspiracy theorists at the time produced much misinformation which confused the public even further.
In 2000, Turkey chose to follow a different path. Entering into a new economic development phase, public desire to control government institutions, the growing middle class, under the shadow of the economic 2001 crisis gave the signals to establish new cultural, social and judicial standards. Important parameters of this period were the establishment of private media and the arrival of the internet in Turkey, which eventually led to more democratic demands from the society. In brief, the relations between the society and the businessmen were redefined during this period. There are two more important factors that contributed to the democratization process in Turkey: One is the reduction of PKK terrorist activity after imprisoning the leader, Abdullah Ocalan. The second one is stopping Hezbullah with a wide range of operations held in Turkey. The European Union process is an additional factor which affected this period. Turkey started to resolve the domestic problems within its borders, which along with the European Union process, led Turkey (with her confidently growing middle class) to demand more democracy, more human rights, and more transparency in the country.

Ergenekon: The New Susurluk?
The hand grenades found in Umraniye on June 12th 2007, didn.t initially appear too threatening. But, the fact that the bombs discovered in Umraniye were found to be from the same series as the bombs from the attack on the Cumhuriyet newspaper.s office raised suspicions. Moreover, the persons involved in the bombing of the newspaper headquarters were found to be in relation to the assassin (Alparslan Aslan) of the president of the State Council, Mustafa Yucel Bilgin. The investigation conducted between July 12, 2007 and October 26, 2008 resulted in 167 persons to be taken into custody of which 70 are currently on trial for promoting a rebellion against the government and planning a coup d.état.
One of the major waves of the operation took place on October 7th 2009 with operations held in Izmir, Ankara, Kayseri, Istanbul, Sakarya, Duzce, Kastamonu, Balikesir, Mugla, Sirnak, Sivas and Tokat. As a result of these operations numerous guns, shotguns, and machine guns were captured and retired bureaucrats, military personnel, businessmen, academicians, and policemen were taken into custody. The important fact in this .tenth wave of operations. is the acquisition of several guns which matched the indictment.s creating the chaos and the base needed for a coup d.état.
Another important factor in these operations is the discovery of the relationship between the Susurluk.s background actors and the new Ergenekon actors. Moreover, the discover of the weapons underground may also mean that much of the clues are buried underground as well. Especially the plastic explosives, TNTs, Anti-tank weapons, hand grenades, Barettas and Glocks found during the operations raise the expectations to shed light on the unresolved assassinations.
If we look as the history of assassinations in Turkey in the last 30 years we see that, Hamit Fendog(lu was killed by a bomb while walking home in 1978, Prosecutor Dog(an Öz was killed with a gun in 1978 while preparing to take a counter-guerilla organization to the court, academicians Bedri Karafak?og(lu and Bedrettin Comert were killed and the assassins are still not known, famous journalist Abdi I.pekçi was killed with a gunshot in February 1979, Gun Sazak, one of the leading figures of the Nationalist Movement was killed with a gun on May 27, 1980, and former Prime Minister Nihat Erim and the president of the Labor Union - DI.SK were also killed during this period. Although in certain cases the assassins were found, they managed to escape, but often the assassination remained unresolved.
The second wave of the mysterious assassinations took place in the 1990s. Famous jurist Muammer Aksoy was killed with a 7.65mm Baretta on January 31, 1990. Intelligence officer Hiram Abas was killed in a similar fashion with a 7.65mm gun (with a silencer), and journalist Çetin Emeç and writer Turan Dursun were murdered with guns. Although to what extent one can associate the weapons fopund underground with the guns used in the assassinations is unclear, it is commonly known that Glocks, Barettas, and Uzis are used for assassinations. In 1990s Bahriye Üçok, Ug(ur Mumcu, Onat Kutlar, and Ahmet Taner K?s,lal? were all killed with a C4 type or plastic explosives in the 1990s.
If we look at the third wave of assassinations we see that writer Necip Hablemitog(lu, jurist Mustafa Yüvel Özbilgin, Priest Santoro, and journalist Hrant Dink were murdered with Barettas and Glocks. With the solid evidence we have in hand, such as from Ümraniye and Sapanca, one can expect that the guns found underground could have possibly been used for the past assassinations. Finding the link between the discovered guns and the guns used in the assassinations make up the most important part of the investigation.

The Point Reached on the Ergenekon Investigation
The Ergenekon investigation faces severe criticism with the point it reached today regarding the excessive time it takes to prepare the indictment as well as the applicability of the judicial procedures. It is clear that the criticism will enable a better functioning investigation process; however it is ultimately dangerous when the criticisms overshadow the process and the successes of the operations and the investigation, especially, claiming that the operations are purely political, as the government is using them to clear the opposition. The Susurluk investigation was not successfully completed for many of the same reasons. If the government and the institutions fully supported the investigation, Turkey would have been promoted to the league of .fully democratic nations. many years ago. Calling the investigations .nonsense., as the Prime Minister did in 1996 was wrong; but it is to not support the prosecutors and the police force- conducting the investigation. In order to get rid of such illegal underground organization, the government and the institutions need to fully cooperate by providing logistical support for the investigations.
The second criticism of the Ergenekon operation regards taking high profile bureaucrats, officers, businessmen into custody who seem to have no links (in public) to the Ergenekon organization. The criticism is strong enough to remind us of the oppressive authoritarian regimes. The Ergenekon investigation has probably gone through the most democratic controls and observations in Turkish history. Heavily criticizing the process and relating it to the oppressive authoritarian periods is unfair considering the fact that there is much room for media to follow everything step by step and criticize every minor mistake in the operations. Above all, the prosecutors and the judges are not on the junta side, they are on the state.s side. Therefore an intervention in the judicial process, heavily and constantly criticizing the judges, will not serve to the best interest of Turkey.
One other criticism of the investigations stems from the possible involvement of high profile persons which is skeptically received by the public. The investigation process continues, but considering that Gladyo in Italy found support even from the President, and in the GAL operation in Spain it was found that high level bureaucrats and politicians were involved and prosecuted, this skepticism is no longer relevant. Of course it is not correct to relate every name associated with the Ergenekon operation to the past assassinations. But it is also not correct to claim that these people cannot possibly be related to the organization because of their high-rank status. Turkey will be able to take a step towards the .democratic league. once it is able to accept the fact that any person including a high-profile figure can be taken to court, tried in front of a judge when a crime is committed.
Categorizing the Ergenekon operation as secular vs. non-secular, Kemalist vs Non-Kemalists is nothing more than manipulating the investigation and the public. After all, even the persons accused are not defending themselves this way. During the Susurluk investigation . the common phrase heard over and over again is .what I did was for the best of my country. and in the Ergenekon investigation, the use of Kemalism, flag, nation, country and etc. is only abusing these values for personal benefit. Using such values in order to prove innocence may have different meanings. At the end of the investigations, if these people are found guilty, they should also think of the damage they made to the values they claim to protect. Therefore the ones demanding the Ergenekon operation are those who want more democracy, more transparency and more justice. The only way to find out the truth is through fully supporting the investigations by providing only constructive criticism to the judges and the prosecutors.


I.hsan Bal

Translated by: Huseyin Akturk

Wednesday, 14 January 2009

Israel's Method in Combating Terrorism

The international community is aware of different Israeli ways of combattin terrorism. The news agencies broadcast live news worldwide about the ways in which Israel eliminates the menace of .terror. targeted its territory and its citizens. Israeli officials state that Hamas, responsible for the thousands of rocket attacks to Israel, is a fierce radical terrorist organization and definitely have to be eliminated. Statements continue as the organization is in line with Taliban in terms of its ideology and it adopts the methods of Al-Qaeda in its terrorist attacks. According to the Israeli officials, the only way for Israel to protect her citizens and bring peace to its territory is the immediate eradication of this terrorist organization.

To succeed in the above mentioned objectives, Israel should examine the methods of other countries who combat terrorism first. Moreover, Israel needs to do its homework well before transferring it into practice. What needs Israel to do as the first and foremost action is to identify the leading figures of Hamas and direct special task force units through these militants. Thus, making a distinction between the innocent people and the targeted militants will be possible as well.

Israel.s New Method

Think about a success story of an anti-terror operation directed towards the terrorist cells in a city with the population of one and half million. Can you locate air strikes, rocket launching warships or huge tanks in this success story? In general, the use of anti-terror task forces with the support of helicopters, surrounding of the terrorist cells and getting the terrorists with special weapons is expected from such an operation. Nevertheless, Israel has been performing just an opposite way of combating terrorism than what is generally accepted. Why is Israel acting this way?

It is simply because the target was not directly the Hamas militants. From the beginning of the Gaza offense, the number of civilians killed is nearly 600. The numbers prove that this is not a raid towards the Hamas cells and not an attempt to capture Hamas militants. Though, in the tenth day of the offense, the world witnessed the victorious (!) moment of war with bewilderment. After killing almost 600 civilians, Israeli soldiers achieved one of the goals of the operation and captured one Hamas militant. Israel employed all possible visual elements to expose the capture of the militant to the rest of the world; however, inability of its methods in combating with terrorism stood still and became widely known as well.

Israel leaves the elimination of Hamas to the Palestinians. The strategy applied in the blockade of Gaza is actually belongs to the Middle Ages, yet, Israel practices a 21st century version of this old fashioned strategy. According to this strategy, when a crime is committed in a community, the whole community is punished with the expectation of isolation of the criminal by the rest. Thus, the processes of capturing, interrogation and trial proposed in modern world are obviated. As an extension of this strategy, in order to eliminate the Hamas militants, Israel puts blockades to the Palestinians on food, water, health and economy first. Israel expected abandonment and the isolation of Hamas by the Palestinians throughout eighteen months of blockade. Yet, the opposite happened and the Palestinians continued to support Hamas as they did in 2006 elections. As another step of the strategy, Israel used direct military force against Palestinians. Air strikes, rocket launching warships and tanks targeted this small piece of land where one and half million Palestinians live. This Israel way of .combating terrorism. injured 2.800 and killed 600 Palestinians since December 27, 2008.

In accordance with its particular method, Israel is trying to reach its goals through collective punishment instead of capturing the exact criminals. Israel does not change the method, yet, it implements expanded operations in a more intrepid manner. Since, the operation created more than a thousand civilian casualties in contrast with only fifty Hezbollah militants, many analysts regarded the 2006 operation as a milestone. Therefore, most of analysts agreed that Israel.s use of conventional weapons and disproportional force in operations against non-governmental bodies has not only a boomerang effect but it is also inappropriate. As a consequence of the operations Israel became a target of international community because of its human right violations. Moreover, Israel also paved the way of Hezbollah to take root in Lebanon in contrary to what she had expected.

Why This Method?

The use of collective punishment to combat terrorism relies on several reasons. The first and foremost reason is the Israel.s belief that it has the ability to establish of a simulation against the reality. Therefore, Israel believes that with psychological warfare, the world can perceive the issue in a different way from the reality and Palestine can be defeated. From this point of view, the operation began with Hamas. rejection of the extension of ceasefire, thus, not as a result of a long preparation and detailed plan of Israel. Moreover, there are thousands of rockets that Hamas launched, yet, only seven people were killed by these rockets. With the emphasis on the Hamas rockets, the Israeli experts more or less give the impression that these rockets killed hundreds or thousands of Israelis, yet the reality is totally different.

Indeed, Hamas is an evil terrorist organization. It is in line with Taliban and is certainly needed to be eliminated through an extensive operation. Nevertheless, when the operation is examined, it seems that the target is not Hamas but the Palestinians. The idea of how to catch Hamas militants with air strike and with missiles from warships in a city with one and half million people is omitted from the discussions. Hundreds of Palestinian civilians were killed in the operations but Israel is still setting the agenda with the rhetoric of protection of its territory and its citizens.

Presenting one out of six hundred as a success is very particular case to Israel. All other countries, even in huge operations against one hundred militants, apologize for the limited number of civilian casualties and promise for not harming civilians in future operations. Nevertheless, the power of Israel does not lie beneath killing hundreds of innocent people for just one militant, rather it lies how Israel portrays this ratio. The supporters of Israel from all over the world intensely present same lines instead of the reality and that helps Israel a lot. We can even say that the power of Israel does not rely on the warplanes or warships but relies on the elements of psychological war. This psychological war continues with the help of student associations, internet networks, debate forms, TV channels, newspapers, and intellectual debate platforms.

Israel.s success on the propaganda issue encourages her to use excessive power, violate human rights and pay no attention to the international organizations. Actually, there are mistakes of Palestinians and in fact Hamas is continuing its misguided policies. And of course Israeli state has the duty to protect its citizens and provide freedom. However, Israel has to accept one reality as all other democratic countries accept: No democracy, no free and secure society can be built on collective punishment of others and abuse of others. mistakes.

There is not a goal reached by competence in killing in the Middle East. Instead of killing, believing in keeping people alive provides a more secure and free Israel. Otherwise abusing the fragmentation of Palestinians, using Hamas as a justification and killing hundreds of Palestinians will not lead Israel to a better end. Instead of manipulating the reality, Israel should face it and develop policies according to this reality.


Israel no longer has the monopoly on the propaganda instruments. There are cameras, television channels, newspapers, internet forums, intellectual circles and voluntary diplomatic representatives in every society for people who want to reveal the reality. Israel has to be aware of this trend. Being against the violations of human rights, war crimes and collective punishments is not about being a supporter of Palestinians or opposing Israel. It is about the necessity to protect the universal values of humanity. Therefore, Israel.s ability to manipulate the reality is losing its base before the people who protect the universal values of humanity and pursue the reality.

Israel-Palestine problem is not limited to these two countries, it has worldwide echoes. In this regard, Israel cannot attain its goals via its particular .combating terrorism. methods. Israel is becoming the prisoner of its own psychological war methods which means the Israeli state.s promises for the secure and free Israel is losing its base. Thus, Israel needs to develop urgent methods to combat with terrorism instead of dealing with Hamas rockets.

Wednesday, 7 January 2009

Ihsan Bal - Head of Security Studies - USAK


Celle Hole (German: Celler Loch) is a breach in the outer wall of the prison of Celle, Germany. First used on July 25, 1978, the name was part of a campaign by the West German secret service (Landesbehörde für Verfassungsschutz) and the GSG 9 in an attempt to lay blame on the Red Army Faction, West Germany's most active and prominent left-wing terrorist group. However, the incident was revealed in 1986 to be a plot by the government, much to the embarrassment of the government. Verfassungsschutz used the name 'operation fire magic' (German: Aktion Feuerzauber).

Verfassungsschutz used a stolen Mercedes SL, driven by two criminals named Klaus-Dieter Loudil and Manfred Berger, who were recruited by Verfassungsschutz. In the car were forged passports, one passport with a photograph of Sigurd Debus. Serial numbers of the passports showed that they were stolen from German authorities. Mr. Debus was an inmate in the Celle prison. He was considered as a Red Army Faction terrorist suspect. Some tools to be used for a prison escape attempt, were brought secretly to Mr. Debus' prison cell by Verfassungsschutz

The action should take place one night earlier, when twelve Verfassungsschutz officers, one GSG 9 demolition squad officer and Jürgen Wiehe, civil servant in the ministry of interior of the state of Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen) waited for the right moment to detonate the bomb on July 24. But they had to interrupt the action since two lovers coming from the nearby funfair run into the danger area. So the action was deferred.

On July 25, 1978 at 2.54 a.m. the bomb was detonated at the outer prison wall, but caused minor damage only. No inmate was able to escape. The Mercedes was caught later in Salzgitter (80 km away) in a police road block, the driver escaped. The false passports and some ammunition was found in the car.

In Celle, a 1.5 square meter hole, named the Celle hole (Celler Loch), was left in the outer prison wall. A handgun, model Walther PPK 7.65, which was the official pistol of one of the Verfassungsschutz officers, as well as a rubber dinghy, were found. Celle prison is situated close to the bank of river Aller. After the detonation, Mr. Debus' conditions of detention were impaired "for security reasons". Hence, the detainee started a hunger strike as a protest against this. Sigurd Debus died on April 16, 1981 shortly before the date of his discharge from prison.


The Directorate of Military Intelligence (Hebrew, Agaf HaModiin - lit. "the Intelligence Section", often abbreviated to Aman) is Israel's central, overarching military intelligence, in the Israel Defense Forces. Aman was created in 1950, when the Intelligence Department was spun off from the IDF's General Staff (then, Agam: ??"?); the Intelligence Department itself was composed largely of former members of the Haganah Intelligence Service (HIS). Aman is an independent service, and not part of the ground forces, navy or the Israeli Air Force. It has a staff of 7,000 personnel (1996 estimate). It is currently headed by Major General (in Hebrew: Aluf) Amos Yadlin.

Aman consists of the following subordinate and professionally subordinate units: Staff uits * Intelligence Corps * Collection Department Collection units * Unit 8200 * Hatzav Unit * Visual Intelligence Branch * HUMINT Branch Research * Research Department Information security * Information Security Department * Military Censor [Part of Aman, but an entirely independent unit, not subordinate to any military or political level, only to parliamentary and judicial oversight] Other units * Supervision Department * External Relations Department * Sayeret Matkal Professionally subordinate units * Air Intelligence Directorate: the intelligence unit of the Israeli Air Force * Naval Intelligence Department: the intelligence unit of the Israeli Sea Corps * Field Intelligence Corps: the intelligence unit of GOC Army Headquarters * The intelligence units of the Regional Commands: Central, Northern, Southern and Home Front Commands Roles and jurisdiction Intelligence Corps badge. The IDF's Intelligence Corps (??? ????????), abbreviated as Haman and headed by a Brigadier General, has been detached from Aman since the Yom Kippur War, but remains under its jurisdiction. In April 2000, the newest IDF corps was founded (the IDF's fifth land corps), the Field Intelligence Corps (??? ??????? ????), abbreviated as Modash (???"?). It was designed to fulfill some of Aman's former combat intelligence functions, and is also headed by a Brigadier General. Unlike Haman, however, Modash falls under the operational jurisdiction of the GOC Army Headquarters, abbreviated as Mazi (??"?), and currently headed by Major General Yiftach Ron-Tal (as of June 10, 2005, outgoing: to be replaced by Major General Benny Gantz, outgoing head of GOC Northern Command). It still falls under Aman's professional jurisdiction however. In 1976, according to the Lexicon of National Security, some of Aman's principal roles consisted of: 1. Intelligence
evaluation for security policy, military planning and 'fluid security policy,' and the dissemination of intelligence to IDF and governmental bodies. 2. Field security at the level of the General Staff (today, Matkal: ???"?), and the training and operation of field security in general (all levels). 3. The operation of military censorship. 4. Direction and operation of the 'Collection Agencies'. 5. Drawing maps; providing the direction and supervision for the dissemination of maps. 6. The development of 'special measures' for intelligence work. 7. The development of intelligence doctrine in the realms of research, collection, and field security. 8. Staff responsibility for military attachés overseas. Aman rcors (1948-1950, nllgncparmn) * 1948-1949 . ssr B'r * 1949-1950 . Colonl Cham Hrzog * 1950-1955 . Colonl Bnyamn Gbl * 1955-1959 . Major Gnral YhoshafaHarkab * 1959-1962 . Major Gnral Cham Hrzog * 1962-1963 . Major Gnral Mr Am * 1964-1972 . Major Gnral Aharon Yarv * 1972-1974 . Major Gnral lZra * 1974-1978 . Major Gnral Shlomo Gaz * 1979-1983 . Major Gnral Yhoshua Saguy * 1983-1985 . Major Gnral huBarak * 1986-1991 . Major Gnral Amnon Lpkn-Shahak * 1991-1995 . Major Gnral UrSaguy * 1995-1998 . Major Gnral MoshYa'alon * 1998-2002 . Major Gnral Amos Malka * 2002-2006 . Major Gnral Aharon Zv-Farkash * 2006-a. Major Gnral Amos Yaln

"Text of the British White Paper Linking Jewish Agency to Zionist Terrorism in Palestine," The New York Times, July 25, 1946, p. 8


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